We examine value creation and destruction in the tobacco industry due to the radical litigation strategy pursued by Brooke Group and its CEO, Bennett LeBow. Brooke Group has a tiny market share, low margins, high leverage, and a high concentration of management ownership. Beginning in 1996 the firm reached settlements in lawsuits brought against all cigarette companies by class action plaintiffs and U.S. state governments. Brooke Group's actions, which included promises to cooperate in litigation against its rivals, spurred other companies to reach settlements on less favorable terms. The settlements eventually led to massive wealth destruction within the tobacco industry but impressive returns for shareholders of Brooke Group.
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Wealth Creation and Destruction from Brooke Group's Tobacco Litigation Strategy
Introduction
On March 13, 1996, Bennett LeBow, Chairman, CEO and controlling shareholder of Brooke Group Ltd., announced that his firm had agreed to settle Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F. 3d 734 (1996) , a class action lawsuit filed by cigarette smokers against the major U.S. tobacco companies. Within two days LeBow also reached settlements with five U.S. states that had sued cigarette manufacturers to recover the cost of tobacco-related Medicaid and Medicare expenses. A more comprehensive settlement between LeBow's company and 22 plaintiff states followed in March 1997. By breaking ranks with industry counterparts who had steadfastly maintained no responsibility for health hazards of smoking, LeBow set the stage for the larger settlement that the industry reached with 46 state governments in November 1998. Brooke Group owns a controlling interest in Liggett, the fifth largest cigarette maker in the U.S. Liggett has a tiny market share, and Brooke Group's capital structure and ownership pattern differ significantly from those of other tobacco companies. Brooke Group's settlements of smoking lawsuits had a dramatic impact on share prices throughout the industry: over the two days following the initial March 1996 announcements, more than $7 billion disappeared from the market capitalization of other tobacco companies, while Brooke Group's equity value rose by $30 2 million, a net-of-market abnormal gain of nearly 20 percent. Similar patterns of returns occurred over the subsequent three years as the tobacco industry's litigation strategy evolved from defiance toward conciliation. Brooke Group shareholders earned returns that were modest in dollar value but enormous in percentage terms, as LeBow repeatedly obtained lenient settlements for his company while agreeing to assist plaintiffs and regulators in their efforts against his far larger rivals. In contrast, other tobacco investors lost billions as the legal environment's deterioration --abetted by LeBow's cooperation with outsiders --motivated companies to settle litigation on terms they had once viewed as unimaginable.
This paper follows LeBow's management of Liggett beginning in 1986, when he purchased its tobacco operations from Grand Metropolitan Plc. in a highly leveraged transaction.
In many ways Liggett and LeBow epitomized the move towards debt financing and concentrated ownership in corporate America during the 1980s. In a series of mostly unsuccessful investments, LeBow pursued a strategy of buying financially troubled companies with junk bond financing, raising their value through asset sales and operational improvements, and recouping his investment by selling a minority stake in an initial public offering. This approach was designed to give LeBow handsome profits on his initial investment while allowing him to retain residual control of the firm. His performance as a creator of shareholder value was at best mixed;
Business Week in a 1996 profile described LeBow as a "minor-league bottom-fisher" and "thirdtier wheeler-dealer" (Lesly, 1996) , and several of his investments led to bankruptcies and shareholder lawsuits. Table 1 gives a chronology of LeBow's major ventures apart from Liggett.
Stock return data indicate that LeBow's Brooke Group shareholders earned handsome returns while other tobacco company stocks performed poorly amid the turmoil LeBow helped 1 RJR-Nabisco spun off its R.J. Reynolds tobacco operations into a stand-alone company on June 15, 1999. Calculations of shareholder returns throughout the paper use the stock of RJR-Nabisco prior to that date, and R.J. Reynolds thereafter.
3 create. Figure I shows the value over time of a $1.00 investment in the four public U.S. tobacco stocks on August 1, 1995, the approximate beginning of LeBow's restructuring activities; the graph extends to September 30, 1999 , soon after the announcement of the U.S. government's lawsuit against the industry. For comparison purposes, the results of a $1.00 investment in the S&P 500 Index are also shown. A $1.00 investment in Brooke Group would have grown in value to $4.35 during the time studied, compared to an outcome of $2.28 from investing in the market index. All three of the other tobacco stocks --Philip Morris, RJR-Nabisco, 1 and Loews -trailed the market during this period, yielding $1.71, $1.28, and $1.22, respectively, from a hypothetical $1.00 investment. Since the other firms were far larger than Brooke Group, their loss in market capitalization represented a small transfer of value to Brooke Group, and a much larger transfer to legal claimants, principally state governments.
Within the tobacco industry, LeBow's efforts to create value differed markedly from the strategies of his rivals. While other companies were preoccupied with overseas expansion and cutthroat domestic battles for market share, LeBow paid little attention to the product markets and instead focused on changing the financial structure of Liggett. His initiatives involved a series of attempts to limit legal liabilities associated with tobacco-related illnesses. Although these liabilities were hypothetical at the time that LeBow acquired Liggett, we argue that he viewed them as an enormous contingent claim against his firm's assets and a significant part of Brooke Group's capital structure. Accordingly, LeBow sought to raise the value of his equity investment by taking actions that he hoped would reduce expected damage payments by his firm.
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Our paper contributes to the literature on how the incentive effects of debt impact corporate strategy and the value of the firm. The example of Brooke Group suggests that these effects are intensified by the presence of potential legal liabilities which can be viewed as a form of pseudo-debt. While tobacco companies have operated within a unique regulatory and political environment, our findings also have relevance for other types of firms that face large hypothetical liabilities, such as those in the handgun, chemical or nuclear power industries. The analysis also has implications for issues such as financial market and product market interaction and the costs and benefits of concentrated ownership.
Figure II provides a schematic of Brooke Group's capital structure using actual 1995 values of long-term debt (book value) and equity (market value). In addition to these traditional components of capital structure, the figure includes a third piece, the expected value of future legal liabilities. Among investors and analysts, these potential damage payments were widely viewed as a drag on firms' equity values; securities analysts often cited legal liability concerns as the reason that tobacco stocks did not trade at the same multiples as equities in comparable industries like food and agricultural products. LeBow's strategy amounted to reducing or eliminating the value of these claims, hoping to transfer the asset value shown on the left side of Figure 1 from legal claimants to equity investors.
LeBow's strategy to reduce litigation exposure evolved through three distinct phases.
First, in conjunction with raider Carl Icahn, LeBow attempted to merge Liggett's tobacco operations with those of RJR-Nabisco and engineer a spinoff of RJR's non-tobacco assets, in order to isolate those assets from the reach of potential jury verdicts. Second, in the midst of his battle for RJR, LeBow settled the Castano and state lawsuits, hoping that RJR shareholders 2 France (1998) describes how tobacco firms' counsel worked together over a period of years to coordinate the industry's litigation strategy. Seib (1998) provides an account of how campaign contributions led to a "special relationship" between the tobacco industry and the Republican party.
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would view the settlement terms favorably and therefore support his bid for control. However, RJR shareholders repudiated this strategy and backed management in an April 1996 proxy vote.
Finally, faced with objections within the industry over his attempts to reduce litigation exposure, LeBow turned against his competitors, settled lawsuits on his own, and began cooperating with government regulatory and litigation efforts.
LeBow's strategic perspective differed wildly from the publicly announced beliefs of other companies in the industry, who disingenuously insisted they faced zero potential legal liability and buttressed this position with aggressive publicity capaigns, litigation defense, and contributions to public officials.
2 For this strategy to succeed, the industry required unanimous participation from its members, given that all companies had similar access to potentially damaging legal materials.
However, the incentives for LeBow to participate in this scheme were not clear-cut. LeBow realized only a tiny share of the benefits from the industry's coordinated defiance, given his firm's negligible market share, and its high leverage meant that any costs of deviating from the group strategy would have fallen largely on LeBow's debtholders (and his rivals). If regulators or litigators secured LeBow's cooperation, they could extract enormous economic rents from other, larger tobacco companies and potentially share this value with LeBow, leaving him with far more than he was earning from the operation of Liggett. We are surprised that other tobacco firms did not pay greater heed to the possibility that LeBow would adopt this viewpoint and break ranks.
Given Brooke Group's capital structure, LeBow's maverick actions seem to fit squarely with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) predictions about the owner-manager of an extremely levered 6 firm, who should be expected to pursue risky strategies with high possible payoffs but low probabilities of success. These risk-shifting incentives arising from the conflicts of interest between equity and risky debt have been discussed extensively in the finance literature (see Green (1984) and John (1987) ). Additionally, our paper highlights the less documented conflicts of interest between security holders (debt, equity) and other claimants against the firm (employees, suppliers, consumers, and society at large). This issue is addressed by Shleifer and Summers (1988) , who argue that the financial gains from takeovers may partly represent wealth transfers from employees and communities. In the tobacco industry, the struggle over assets between equity holders and litigation claimants has resembled similar conflicts in such industries as asbestos (Johns Manville), birth control devices (A.H. Robins), and silicone breast implants (Dow Corning).
In addition to its implications for the incentive properties of debt, our paper has relevance for legal theories of plea bargaining in which the first mover obtains more lenient treatment by agreeing to cooperate with authorities. Kobayashi (1992) provides a model in which a prosecutor uses plea bargaining as a device to "buy" information from malfeasors. Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum (1988) Wynder and Graham (1950) and Doll and Hill (1950) . Earlier works had linked smoking to diseases, but these lacked the rigid scientific protocol required to establish causation. Whelan (1984) mentions many of these early studies. outcomes of litigation. While the tobacco industry was famous for decades for never having lost a case, by the mid-1990s the possibility that firms would one day be held liable for large damages seemed more likely.
The First Wave (1950s-60s)
During the early 1950s a host of new medical studies suggested a high correlation between smoking and the incidence of lung cancer. Most of these cases, including Lowe, were simply dropped by plaintiffs without formal disposition (Rabin, 1992) , largely as a consequence of the legal defense strategy adopted by the tobacco industry. The industry decided to defend every claim, regardless of cost, through exhaustive discovery, inquiry into plaintiffs' personal habits and medical histories, lengthy trials involving numerous expert witnesses, and all necessary appeals. The financial resources that the industry used to underwrite this costly litigation strategy were too large to be matched by a 6 In the words of an R. J. Reynolds lawyer, "The aggressive posture we have taken regarding deposition and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for the plaintiffs' lawyers. . . To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won the cases is not by spending all of Reynolds' money, but by making that other son-of-bitch spend all of his." (Hilts, 1996, p. 197) .
10 typical small law firm or "lone wolf" personal injury lawyer who represented plaintiffs, generally on a contingency-fee basis that required attorneys to bear the entire costs of litigation. 
The Second Wave (1980s-Early 1990s)
On January 11, 1964, the U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and
Health released its report that examined data about smoking. The essence of its findings was contained in a summary conclusion:
" Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.
Over the next two decades, the American public experienced a great attitudinal shift towards smoking as its appeal faded due to health concerns. Figure III shows that after publication of the Surgeon General's report in 1964, per capita consumption of cigarettes in the United States began a sustained, pronounced decline. Much federal legislation and rulemaking was enacted to restrict the tobacco industry, including such provisions as bans on advertising in broadcast media and prohibitions against smoking on commercial airline flights. Table 2 presents a chronology of U.S. regulatory milestones.
By the early 1980s, the evolution of product liability tort law had made suing the tobacco industry more credible (Rabin 1992) . Personal injury lawyers had scored impressive victories in asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and Agent Orange "toxic tort" cases. These verdicts occurred partly because of a greater willingness by state courts to impose strict liability on firms that were found Glantz's office at the University of California, San Francisco. Copies of the actual documents are deposited in the Archives and Special Collections Department of the Library at UCSF and are available to public. These papers have since been admitted as evidence in a number of trials. The story of how these documents were purloined by a paralegal working for Brown & Williamson has been told in many newspaper stories. An interesting source is Hilts (1996) . 12 dangers of smoking that it had not revealed, it could be liable for damages.
The Third Wave (1994-Present)
In 1994 a series of events precipitated a new wave of litigation that has so far resulted in settlements requiring the industry to pay out several hundred billion dollars in damages over the coming years. In April 1994, the CEOs of U.S. tobacco firms testified before a House of 
LeBow's efforts to create value from Brooke Group's ownership of Liggett
To understand LeBow's non-traditional attempts to limit the dangers of litigation to the tobacco industry, one must appreciate how differently Brooke Group was financed and performed compared to its rivals. Table 3 presents relevant financial and product market data about the four public U.S. cigarette companies in 1995. Brooke Group, with 2 percent market share and slightly more than $300 million in annual sales, was dwarfed in size by the others. Brooke Group barely broke even in terms of its operating profits, while its rivals earned extremely attractive margins, and Brooke Group was far more heavily leveraged than the others. This combination of low profitability and high leverage implied that LeBow had little to lose if he pursued strategies that turned out to destroy value, as the wealth reduction would largely impact Brooke Group's creditors. On the other hand, LeBow owned 56.5 percent of Brooke Group's equity, an extraordinarily high ownership concentration that allowed him personally to enjoy the benefits from any wealth creation strategy. We believe LeBow's management of Liggett reflected these asymmetric incentives, as he pursued extraordinarily risky tactics that would have made far less sense in a profitable, low-levered firm with a low concentration of management ownership. 10 We were unable to implement the more standard market model approach to calculating abnormal returns because of the atypical behavior of Brooke Group's stock up to 1995. The stock was thinly traded and extremely volatile, and we obtained unusual and unstable estimates of its â from historical regressions. T-statistics for our abnormal return calculations are based on the standard deviation of each stock's daily returns over the 120 trading days prior to August 1, 1995. 
Attempts to gain control of RJR-Nabisco
LeBow's first efforts to reduce the impact of legal liabilities on the value of tobacco companies occurred during his 1995-96 campaign for control of RJR-Nabisco. RJR, the wellknown tobacco and food company whose 1989 leveraged buyout was the theme of the bestseller Barbarians at the Gate, had seen its stock price languish after an initial public offering in 1991.
Analysts widely attributed the stock's weakness to the possibility that RJR's food assets might someday be liquidated to satisfy the damage claims of tobacco litigants. LeBow sought to increase the value of RJR by proposing a spinoff of the food assets as a way of removing the hypothetical litigation encumbrance. He also proposed to merge RJR's tobacco operations with those of his own company, Liggett. Table 4 and Figure IV show the abnormal wealth increases for both Brooke Group and RJR-Nabisco during LeBow's 1995-96 restructuring efforts, which were steadfastly opposed by RJR management. We calculate abnormal stock returns as the difference between each company's stock return and the return on the S&P 500 Index.
11 Abnormal changes in market capitalization equal the product of each firm's market cap and the abnormal stock return. All returns are presented on a cumulative three-day basis, lasting from the day before to the day after each event.
In August 1995, LeBow received regulatory clearance from the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission to buy as much as 15 percent of RJR-Nabisco stock. RJR also disclosed that it had previously rejected a proposal by LeBow to combine its tobacco operations with Brooke Group's 12 The five states were Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and West Virginia. The significance of LeBow's actions was reflected, for example, in The Wall Street Journal's characterization of the settlement as a "shocking capitulation at a time when other tobacco firms were still vowing never to give in." Freedman and Hwang (1997) . 13 The marketing restrictions involved refraining from the use of cartoon characters in cigarette advertising, eliminating any coupon, value-added benefit or service appealing to children, and not advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds.
15
Liggett unit. Over the next two months investor Carl Icahn began a similar campaign to acquire shares in RJR and effect a spinoff of its food operations. Icahn and LeBow joined forces and together acquired just under 5 percent of RJR's stock. In October they announced plans for a proxy fight in support of a Nabisco spinoff. As shown by Table 4 and Figure Table 4 indicate that RJR's stock gave up virtually all of the net-of-market gains it had achieved during LeBow's and Icahn's involvement. Though Brooke Group's stock also fell as the RJR merger initiative collapsed, it remained marginally (though not significantly) higher on a net-of-market basis than it had been the previous August, perhaps because investors saw value in LeBow's litigation strategy.
Efforts to reach a comprehensive legal settlement
A resolution of legal claims could have benefitted the industry if it had less onerous 16 A clear analogy exists to criminal law, in which a defendant who cooperates with prosecutors usually receives more lenient treatment than co-conspirators who are convicted as a result of his testimony. At one point during Brooke Group's series of settlements with state governments, the attorney general of Michigan remarked that "We got the least important culprit to turn state's evidence and give testimony against the really bad guys" (Broder, 1997) .
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consequences than investors were expecting from the array of government and personal injury suits progressing through the courts. Further, any settlement or verdict may have benefitted certain companies more than others, if its terms were contingent on such variables as market share or profitability. LeBow appears to have recognized and exploited this latter possibility, as he continued to pursue his strategy of accommodation with regulatory authorities even after it undermined his plan to merge with RJR. Table 5 and Figure VI The Republicans' estrangement from the industry began after an embarrassing 1996 television interview of presidential candidate Sen. Robert Dole on the Today program, during which Dole cast doubt on the dangers of smoking. Soon after, in a widely reported quote, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich said that he would not allow President Clinton "to get to the left of me" on the tobacco issue, implying that the Republican Congress would support tobacco legislation even more 20 Nabisco CEO Steven Goldstone had said for the first time that he would be interested in a "resolution" of legal, regulatory and social controversy surrounding cigarettes (Freedman and Hwang, 1997) While legislators attempted to rewrite the settlement in order to extract more economic value from the industry, they also attempted to bend its terms in ways that would favor Brooke
Group, apparently as a reward for LeBow's role. As described by Bulow (1998) , the McCain bill included a provision subjecting each cigarette pack to a tax of $1.10, with an exemption for those companies holding less than 3 percent market share. Assuming that Liggett increased its prices by the amount of this tax while holding its market share below 3 percent, the provision amounted to a "bonanza" potentially worth $600 million per year to Brooke Group. LeBow's personal share of this income stream could have made him a billionaire many times over (Passell, 1998) . Figure VI shows that Brooke Group's stock rose steadily and dramatically between mid-1997 and early 1998 as these indirect subsidies to Liggett were discussed in Washington; when the settlement collapsed in the late spring, Brooke Group's stock then began a decline that lasted until settlement talks revived.
Faced with much harsher marketing restrictions and damage payments than they had envisioned, the major tobacco companies began to distance themselves from the settlement legislation pending before Congress and even mounted advertising campaigns against various bills.
On April 8, 1998, RJR-Nabisco repudiated the June 1997 settlement, adding that it would However, many features of the June 1997 settlement were absent from the November 1998 pact, and the industry remained far more exposed to legal liability than it would have if the earlier agreement had taken effect. In particular, the industry continued to face class action suits and suits by individual smokers with no limit to potential damages. The federal government was 23 also free to pursue the industry for reimbursement of health care expenditures, which it did in a lawsuit filed in September 1999. An array of foreign governments, labor unions, HMOs, and other organizations also were making use of this litigation strategy (Meier, 1988) .
LeBow's payoff
To conclude the November 1998 settlement, the parties needed to entice Brooke Group to abandon the legal rights that it had secured in its March 1996 and March 1997 settlements with various state governments. Because of those agreements, Brooke Group did not have to obey marketing restrictions as stringent as those imposed on its rivals in the November 1998 pact, and
Brooke would pay lower per-pack damages, effectively allowing it to out-market and under-price Morris. Essentially, LeBow had monetized the attractive settlement terms he had negotiated in 1996 and 1997. Wall Street tobacco analysts characterized the transaction variously as "the deal of the century," "amazing," and "LeBow beating the industry at its own game" (Schwartz, 1998; 24 Obermayer, 1998) . In addition, the new settlement allowed Liggett to avoid the estimated 40 cents per pack damage payments imposed on the other companies, so long as Brooke Group's market share remained below 1.67 percent (Edwards, 1998) ; this cost advantage represented a potential $100 million in incremental annual cash flow (Obermayer, 1998) .
Brooke Group's stock price rose from $9e on November 17 to $19c on November 25 as the settlement terms and the Philip Morris transaction came to light, and the stock continued to rise to $24d by December 31. This huge increase in the company's equity value appeared to validate LeBow's controversial litigation strategy.
Parallel efforts by LeBow to resolve personal injury litigation
LeBow's litigation strategy all but eliminated Brooke Group's exposure to damages from health care reimbursement actions brought against the tobacco companies by the 50 U.S. state governments. While LeBow was implementing this strategy between 1996 and 1998, he attempted to achieve a similar low-cost resolution of claims by individual smokers, whether brought as individual or class action lawsuits.
Brooke Group in 1998 reached a preliminary settlement of a class action lawsuit filed in the Alabama state courts. The agreement, in the case Fletcher v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. CV97-913 (AL Cir. Ct., Mobile Cty.), purported to protect the company from further personal injury litigation anywhere in the United States. However, the settlement has been repeatedly challenged by groups protesting its leniency toward LeBow's company, and an adverse August 1999 ruling cast doubt on its future. See Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter (1998, 1999a, 1999b) , Van Voris (1998) , and Schmitt (1999) 25
The Fletcher settlement would absolve Liggett of all tobacco-related claims currently pending and all claims that would accrue during the next 25 years. In exchange for this immunity, Brooke Group would pay $10 million immediately plus annual payments over the next 25 years equal to the greater of $1 million or 9 percent of Liggett's pretax profits. The company also consented to FDA regulation of cigarettes and a host of marketing restrictions similar to those in its other settlements. From a financial standpoint, the settlement was attractive to Brooke Group partly because of Liggett's negligible operating profits; other tobacco companies would almost certainly regard the settlement's damages formula as prohibitively expensive.
At least two legal issues have emerged as roadblocks to the agreement. The first concerns whether the Alabama state courts have jurisdiction to resolve claims of smokers throughout the U.S. in the unusual "mandatory class action" format of the Fletcher case; if the settlement is eventually approved in Alabama, this issue will almost certainly serve as the basis for years of appeals in the U.S. federal courts. Second, the Fletcher settlement received court approval as a "limited fund class action" partly because of Brooke Group's precarious financial condition at the time that the suit was filed. Several groups challenging the settlement in 1999 argued that the $300 million infusion from Philip Morris in November 1998 had significantly improved the company's balance sheet, extinguishing the rationale for a "limited fund" proceeding in which the company's assets are far smaller than its expected liabilities.
The potential value to Brooke Group and other tobacco companies of limiting immunity from personal injury suits was highlighted by two major trial verdicts against Philip Morris in early 1999. On February 10, a California jury found against the company and awarded $51.5 million in damages to a woman who had contracted lung cancer after smoking Philip Morris's Marlboro 18 Interestingly, Brooke Group stock did not fall as much as other companies' in the aftermath of these verdicts. Twoday stock price changes on February 10-11 were -11.02 percent for Philip Morris, -8.71 percent for RJR-Nabisco, -4.74 percent for Loews, and -2.80 percent for Brooke Group. On March 30-31, the stock price changes were -14.57 percent for Philip Morris, -13.61 percent for RJR, -8.15 percent for Loews, and -7.09 percent for Brooke Group (returns are statistically significant for all companies except Brooke). 
Conclusions
The tobacco industry in the mid-1990s faced a variety of litigation claims from consumers and government authorities. Bennett LeBow, CEO of cigarette manufacturer Brooke Group, created enormous value for shareholders by adopting a litigation strategy very different from that of his industry rivals. While other tobacco companies steadfastly refused to settle lawsuits or cooperate with regulatory authorities, LeBow pursued a strategy of accommodation. By being the first firm in the industry to reach agreements with plaintiffs, LeBow's company secured lenient settlement terms in exchange for cooperating in lawsuits against others. Though LeBow's actions contributed to massive destruction of wealth within the tobacco industry, his own small firm increased in value substantially as regulators implicitly allowed Brooke Group to obtain a portion of the economic rents extracted from his competitors.
Our paper extends the literature on how debt affects managerial behavior by highlighting the connection between financial leverage and hypothetical legal liabilities. LeBow's apparent 27 insight was to recognize that large contingent legal claims from tobacco lawsuits represented pseudo-debt on Brooke Group's balance sheet. Under these conditions, LeBow rationally pursued a high-risk strategy of attempting to increase equity value by reducing the value of other claims against his firm's assets. LeBow's actions seem entirely predictable to us, given his firm's tiny market share, negligible cash flow, levered capital structure (even in the absence of litigation), and high ownership concentration. Indeed, an unexplained puzzle of this story is why Philip Morris and the other tobacco companies did not recognize this possibility and buy out Liggett from LeBow years earlier, especially given his reputation as an unorthodox manager with little regard for financial convention.
Our study also illustrates opportunities for value creation for both regulators and defendant corporations during legal plea-bargaining. In our example, government authorities extended generous financial terms to a small player, and by doing so gained information that facilitated value extraction from other, larger firms. This dramatic outcome of this strategy in the case of tobacco may influence product liability litigation in other industries such as handguns. 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 Figure III Per capita consumption of cigarettes in the United States by year. Source:
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Figure VI Tobacco Company Stock Returns During Settlement Negotiation Period
Value of a $1.00 investment in the stocks of U.S. tobacco manufacturers compared to the S&P 500 Index during the period in which the major tobacco companies attempted to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of litigation brought by state governments and individual plaintiffs. Stock return information was obtained from the CRSP database. Table 4 Major Events in LeBow's Battle for Control of RJR-Nabisco
Major events and associated stock market reactions during Bennett LeBow's 1995-96 battle for control of RJR-Nabisco. The table presents three-day abnormal returns for the stock of both Brooke Group and RJR-Nabisco, measured in both percent change in stock price and increase in market capitalization (in millions). Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the stock price return and the return on the S&P 500 Index. T-statistics appear in parentheses below abnormal market capitalization changes. 
Entire Period
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively. 42   Table 5 Major Events in Tobacco Settlement Negotiations Major events and associated stock market reactions during the period in which the major tobacco companies attempted to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of litigation brought by state governments and individual plaintiffs. The table presents three-day abnormal returns for the stock of Brooke Group and an equal-weighted average of the stocks of Philip Morris, RJR-Nabisco, and Loews, as well as abnormal market capitalization changes for Brooke Group and for the sum total of the three other tobacco companies. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the stock price return and the return on the S&P 500 Index. T-statistics appear in parentheses below abnormal market capitalization changes. 
